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2ABSTRACT
Post-accident hydrogen generation in BWR containments is analyzed as a
function of engineered hydrogen control system, assumed either nitrogen
inerting or air dilution. Fault tree analysis was applied to assess the
failure probability per demand of each system. These failure rates were
then combined with the probability of accidents producing various hydrogen
generation rates to calculate the overall system hydrogen control probability.
Results indicate that both systems render approximately the same overall
hydrogen control probability (air dilution: .917 - .989; nitrogen inerting:
.987 - .998). Drywell entries and unscheduled shutdowns were also analyzed
to determine the impact on the total BWR accident risk as it relates to the
decay heat removal system. Results indicate that inerting may increase the
overall risk due to a possible increase in the number of unscheduled shut-
downs due to a lessened operator ability to correct and identify "unidentified"
leakage from .the primary coolant system. Further, possible benefits of
inerting due to reduced torus corrosion and fire risk in containment appear
to be dominated by the possible operations related disbenefits.
3
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5EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) has led to a re-evaluation
of federal safety regulations and utility operating procedures. Because
of concern over hydrogen production from zircalloy fuel cladding oxidation
in accidents where fuel temperatures rise substantially, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has made several recommendations for change
in operating facilities. One of these recommendations would require the
Vermont Yankee containment structure to be inerted with nitrogen.
Although other Mark I BWRs are now inerted, it has not been quantita-
tively established that public health risk has been reduced by this pro-
cedure. Moreover, many utility engineers are concerned over the possibility
that inerting might actually increase public health risk. They argue that
a readily accessible containment may be a significant factor affecting
accident mitigation. Also, utilities are concerned that inerting may
increase occupational health risks. Concern over worker safety arises
from the fact that nitrogen will replace oxygen in the containment causing
the atmosphere to be unbreathable. To establish sound technical bases for
positions taken on licensing safety issues, utilities are in need of
quantitative analyses of such important matters.
This study applies the best state-of-the-art methods to assess the
impact of containment entries made at the Vermont Yankee plant, combined
with the established framework of WASH-1400 for the Peachbottom BWR plant,
to establish as quantitatively as possible the safety impact of containment
inerting. Technical alternatives to nitrogen inerting (e.g., controlled
burning of hydrogen, etc.) may reduce occupational hazards while ensuring
the same degree of control over hypothetical hydrogen releases. In this
work, the hazards of nitrogen inerting and the post-accident hydrogen
generation problem are analyzed as a function of the engineered hydrogen
6control system in place at the plant. Two systems are analyzed: the con-
tainment inerting system (CIS) in place at all but two BWRs in the U.S.,
and the containment air dilution system (CAD) operating at the Vermont
Yankee nuclear power station. Fault tree analysis is applied to assess the
failure probability per demand of both systems.
The probability of various accident scenarios and hydrogen generation
rates are combined with the system failure probabilities to calculate the
overall system hydrogen control probability.--- Results indicate
that both systems render approximately the same overall hydrogen control
probability (CAD = 0.917 to 0.989; CIS = 0.987 (Pilgrim) to 0.998 (Peachbottom),
Operating procedures and non-inerted drywell entries are also analyzed,
since the possibility exists that an increase in the number of unscheduled
shutdowns can increase the probability per reactor-year of an accident
initiated by a loss of the decay heat removal system (HRS). The Reactor
Safety Study (WASH-1400) showed that the HRS failure event scenario domin-
ates the overall BWR accident risk by at least an order of magnitude.
Assuming a two-fold increase in the number of unscheduled reactor shutdowns
as a result of inerting (i.e., inability of operators to correct and identify
leakage classified as "unidentified"), the overall BWR safety risk is in-
creased in direct proportion to the increase in the number of shutdowns.
It would appear, therefore,.that inerting may result in an increase in
the overall BWR accident risk if there is a significant increase in plant
shutdow.ns for inerted containments.
It is therefore recommended that alternatives to inerting be seriously
evaluated as possible candidates for post-accident hydrogen control in
BWRs. Moreover, a preliminary analysis of the torus corrosion and fire
_
7prevention aspects of inerting does not reveal substantial benefits to
counterweight the safety-related disadvantages associated with delayed
maintenance and drywell leakage identification.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This thesis describes a probabilistic safety analysis of
containment inerting in boiling water reactors (BWRs). The
incident at Three Mile Island (TMI) resulted in a renewal
of interest in the hydrogen generation problem. This chapter reviews
the TMI incident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)
recommendations, and finally, concludes with a statement of the
objective of .this work.
1.1 Hydrogen Generated During the Accident at Three Mile Island
During the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI), a significant
amount of hydrogen was produced through the oxidation of zirconium
cladding as it interacted with steam. The amount of cladding that
reacted with water has been estimated to be between-50 to 70
percent. Previous design basis accidents had expected less than
a .1% metal-water reaction. Alter the first few hours of the
accident, some of the hydrogen was trapped in the upper region of
the reactor vessel above the inlet and outlet nozzle (see Fig. 1.1).
The hydrogen was distributed between the gas-steam bubble
in the vessel, the gas that dissolved in the -reactor coolant,
and the gas which escaped to the reactor building through the open
pressure relief valve on the pressurizer., About nine hours into
the accident, a pressure pulse of 28 psig was recorded in the
containment building due. to the burning of hydrogen. The pressure
spike was below the 60 psig design pressure of the containment
building, and well below the expected burst pressure of 160 psig.
Loop A Loop B
Figure 1.1 Primary system depressurizing and releasing hydrogen through the pressurizer into
the containment.
H
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The fact that a hydrogen burn occurred was later confirmed when
oxygen analyzers in the containment showed a depletion of the
oxygen content.2 A report prepared by Batelle Columbus Laboratories
2
indicates that the measured 28 psig pressure pulse did not necessarily
represent a uniform pressure increase because the quantity ofr.
hydrogen that burned (inferred from the oxygen depletion as 1034
lbs of hydrogen) is substantially greater than that required to
explain the measured containment pressure increase (564 lbs of
hydrogen). This discrepancy can be explained if it is assumed that
the hydrogen formed a non-uniform distribution inside the containment.
This means that much higher pressures could have existed locally.
However, if such high pressures did exist, the instrumentation either
did not (or could not) monitor them.
1.2 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Lessons-Learned Task Force
The amnot-of hydrogen generated by the large metal-water
reaction at LI and the resulting pressure increase in the contain-
ment were considered in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
(NRC) TMI-2 Lessons-Learned Task Force In that report, recommen-
dations were made for the control of post-accident generated
hydrogen. One of the NRC's recommendations was that .all Mark I-
and Mark II BWR containments should be inerted with nitrogen to pre-
vent against hydrogen burns or explosions. This recommendation
was made since the relatively small volume of Mark I and Mark II
containments (approximately 300,000 cubic feet) have a smaller
margin available to accomodate metal-water reactions as compared
to larger containments. Recommendations were based on the
4
regulatory position specified in Regulatory Guide 7.1.
Requirements for hydrogen control are based on three possible
hydrogen generation paths: (i) metal-water reactions involving
the zirconium fuel cladding and the reactor coolant, (ii) radiolytic
decomposition of the water, and (iii) corrosion of metals by
solutions used for emergency cooling and containment spray.
Hydrogen generated during an accident may react with oxygen
in the containment atmosphere. This reaction can take place at
a rapid enough rate to lead to the rupture of the containment due
to overpressurization. Government regulations specify that nuclear
power plants should have the capability to: (i) monitor the hydrogen
concentration in the containment, (ii) mix the containment atmos-
phere, and (iii) control combustible gas concentrations without
relying on purging and/or repressurization of the containment
atmosphere following a loss-of -coolant accident (LOCA). Inerted
containments satisfy the above requirements. Only two plants with
Mark I containments, (Hatch 2 and Vermont Yankee) use other
types of hydrogen control systems. However, the current position
of the NRC task force (as of 1980) requires that these plants also
inert their containments in a manner similar to other operating
plants around the country.
1.3 Study Objective
The objective of this thesis is to analyze two common methods
for hydrogen control used in boiling water reactors (BWRs), namely
inerting and the air dilution systems, and their ability to
handle combustible mixtures of hydrogen. This thesis is organized
16
as follows: Chapter 2 describes the hazards of inerting with nitrogen,
using as an example the incident at the nuclear plant in Tarapur,
India. In Chapter 2, the inerting controversy is also briefly
described, particularly as it relates to the Vermont Yankee
nuclear power station. Chapter 3 reviews the hydrogen generation
problem in terms of mechanisms for hydrogen generation, flammability
limits, deflagration and detonation. Also discussed are the
effects of hydrogen generation on the containment, a brief des-
cription of different types of BWR containments, and available
methods for hydrogen control. Chapter 4 analyzes containment failure
modes due to hydrogen generation. An event tree is also developed
to illustrate the sequence of events that may lead to degraded
core conditions and/or meltdown. The containment air dilution
(CAD) system of Vermont Yankee and the containment inerting system
(CIS) of Pilgrim I and Peachbottom II are analyzed using fault
tree analysis to determine their failure, rate per ree - er.
Finally, the ability of each system to handle hydrogen is quantified
through use of WASH-1400 probabilities on accident scenarios that
produce hydrogen. Chapter 5 analyzes the impact of containment
inerting on the frequency of accident initiating events. The
potential impact of inerting on operational procedures are discussed
using Vermont Yankee drywell entry data and the effects of additional
shutdowns on overall BWR accident risk are quantified. Chapter 6
presents conclusions and recommendations.
17
CHAPTER TWO
THE INERTED CONTAINMENT PROBLEM
In BWRs using containment inerting systems, the primary
containment is inerted with nitrogen within 24 hours after startup
of the reactor and is deinerted 24 hours prior to reactor shutdown.15
During normal operation, the primary. containment has 4% oxygen
and 96% nitrogen by volume. (Air contains -21% oxygen and 79%
nitrogen by volume).
2.1 Hazards of Inerting with Nitrogen
If a person breathes in an atmosphere where the oxygen concen-
tration is below 20%, his respiration rate will increase slightly
until the oxygen, concentration decreases below 8% by volume. This
condition is called anoxia, and increases not only the breath
rate, but also the pulse rate (Fig. 2.1). The body is relatively
unresponsive to small decreases in the oxyg'en concentration. However,
sharp oxygen reductions cause the body to react strongly since the
13
cells will need more oxygen to form CO 2 . The rate and depth of
respiration is controlled by a respiratory center at the base of
the brain. If the anoxia process is gradual, the subject's per-
formance will deteriorate so gradually that they may not be fully
aware of what is happening 7 When anoxia is severe, the individual
loses consciousness in a matter of seconds and .will die unless
help is obtained. If the person does not die, there is the
possibility of irreversible brain damage, 'specifically to the
central nervous system which cannot sustain a prolonged -ters of
oxygen. 3 The person who suffers a cardiac arrest befo-re the heart
is artifically caused to resume beating may spend the rest of his
18
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life as a retarded adult due to severe brain damage.1 7
There are many recorded cases of accidents caused by anoxia,
e.g. miners entering a shaft containing methane and C02 , and
workers entering a supposedly deinerted atmosphere. At the
Westinghouse Astronuclear Core operational facility, a man died
after entering a furnace that contained argon. The argon was
being used to purge the furnace in the last stages of cooldown
18
as part .of the process of leaching fuel elements. However, the
most dramatic death due to anoxia to occur in the nuclear power
industry was the incident at the Tarapur nuclear power station in
India.
2.2 The Tarapur Atomic Power Station Incident
In July 1970, a maintenance supervisor at the Tarapur atomic
power station in India died of asphyxiation (according to the
autopsy) during an entry into a chamber that was supposed to be
deinerted. The chamber atmosphere, which had been inerted with
nitrogen some eight months before the incident, contained only 7%
oxygen at the time of entry (compared to -21% oxygen in air).
Although the Indian government has been reluctant to discuss
the case, it has been inferred that the man died due to the low
concentration of oxygen in the chamber atmosphere. In order to have
a complete picture of the incident, the physical layout of the
Tarapur facility and the accident itself is now described.
The station consists of two boiling water reactors, each
running its own individual turbine generator designed to produce
210 MWe, for a combined 420 MWe output for the total plant.
In such a "dual" facility, each reactor has a separate reactor
20
vessel, reactor drywell and stppression pool. Above the suppression
pools, there is one large chamber, called the "common chamber",
which is connected to both reactors' suppression pools by a set of
diaphragms or blowout disks. The common chamber has a personnel
lock, which is a double door connected at mid-height with the
diaphragm. The drywell and suppression pool of unit 1, and the
common chamber were inerted in November- of 1969. However, due
to steam and/or air leaks, the drywell pressure was found to
29
increase frequently and had to be vented.
According to Robert L. Turner, the resident warranty representa-
tive for the General Electric Company at the Tarapur facility,
the incident occurred after a shutdown of .one of the units during
a turbine maintenance outage30 One of the tests that is run prior
to putting a unit back in service is a containment leak test.
Normally, this is performed by testing the leak tightness of the
drywell and the suppression pool, which are interconnected.
During this test at' the Tarapur plant, operators found a higher
than expected leakage between the unit and the common chamber..
They concluded that it was necessary to go inside the chamber to
inspect the diaphragm.
During preparation for the entry, concern was raised about
whether or not the common chamber had been adequately purged of
nitrogen. It was assumed that the common chamber had been purged
two or three times since November 1969. The oxygen monitoring
system also indicated a normal oxygen level inside the chamber.
Three people-- the chief superintendent who was the ranking official at
the site, and one of the shift supervisors- went into'the personnel
21
lock to check its appearance and performance, since this was an
area that had been closed for a number of months. Once inside
the lock, they closed the outer door and opened the inner door to
the common chamber. They looked inside the chamber with a flash-
light without leaving the personnel lock. After three minutes,
they went out saying that they did not see anything wrong except
a smell of stale paint. The sequence of events during the next
entry, as well as the personnel involved, are shown in Table 2.1.
In suzmary, three men entered the lock and two went into the common
chamber for inspection. After a few minutes all three men became
unconscious due to anoxia and were pulled out. During the rescue,
another person went into the common chamber and also became uncon-
scious. He could not be revived and was the single casualty of
the incident.
After the incident, the air inside the common chamber was tested
and showed an oxygen level of only 7%. Apparently, oxygen samples
were not taken before the entry was made; the possibility also
exists that a faulty air monitoring system was used. After this
incident, the primary containment vessels at the Tarapur plant
have never again been inerted.
2.3 The History of Containment Inerting at Vermont Yankee
At the Vermont Yankee plant operated by the Yankee Atomic Co.,
the hazards of inerting with nitrogen have been emphasized in licensing
hearings since 1971. On November 5, 1971 the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) asked Vermont Yankee for information regarding the control of
combustible gases which could be generated in a hypothetical loss-
of-coolant accident. Vermont Yankee responded by presenting an
22
Table 2.1
SEQUENCE OF ENTRY INTO THE COMMON CHAMBER AT THE TARAPUR ATOMIC
POWER STATION (ACCORDING TO ROBERT TURNER'S TESTIMONY). 3 0
Personnel Involved
Chief Superintendent (CS) Maintenance Supervisor (MS)
Operations Superintendent (OS) GE Warranty Representative (WR)
Maintenance Foreman (MF) Shift Supervisor (SS)
Maintenance Person (M) Healt Physicist (HP)
Event Sequence
-OS, F, MP went into personnel lock.
-OS, MF stepped into the common chamber on its grating with flashlights,
wearing no protective gear other than coveralls.
-OS, MF flashed lights on, trying to look at the diaphragms 10 feet below.
-OS told MF that he did not feel too well. He though it would be a good
idea to leave the chamber.
-OS started out, looked behind him and saw that MF had collapsed on the
grating.
-OS picked 1F up and carried him to the personnel lock.
-HP helped OS to put MF into the lock.
-OS collapsed at the inner door.
-MP pushed OS into the Lock, apparently closed the inner door and opened
the outer door.
-MS who was outside at the time of the events above, saw there was a problem,
jumped into the lock and closed the outer door.
-MS saw OS on the floor of the chamber; the inner door was opened.
-MS probably tried to pick OS up but collapsed'
-WR, SS outside heard something knocking inside, opened outer door and
found MF and MP in the lock.
-WR, -SS took MF out the lock. MF was concious.
-MP jumped out of the lock.
-SS went into the lock followed by UR and HP.
-WR went into common chamber and found MS and OS unconcious.
-WR took both MS and OS into the personnel lock.
-MS was pulled out of the lock, and one person started giving him artificial
respiration.
-OS was pulled out and INR started giving him artificial respiration until
OS began to breach.
-WR tried to help MS.
-Maintenance crew carried one big oxygen cylinder to the point where
MS was.
-Plant doctor arrived and started giving MS a lung pumping motion without
any result.
*WR found MS with a bump on his head. It was assumed that he hit something
inside the chamber and was too weak to leave quickly.
23
approach involving the addition of nitrogen to the containment.37
The use of an inerted containment was accepted by the AEC as a short
term method of controlling combustible gases based on technical
specifications for inerting.21 However, spokesmen for Vermont Yankee
stated that, for a longer term, they would pursue alternative
gas control systems to avoid the hazards of nitrogen inerting.
On October 12, 1972, the Vermont Yankee operating license
was ammended by the NRC to authorize for full power operation
provided that an inerted atmosphere was maintained during the
normal operations (with the exception of startup test programs and
38demonstration of plant electrical output). Startup of the plant was
substantially completed by June, 1974, and plant electrical output
was demonstrated by December, 1972.
High power testing was performed during Febtuary and' March
of 1974 when restrictions on power level were removed and the
plant operated at its 100% capacity level of 540 MWe. After
attaining normal operations the ACE concluded in a safety evaluation
39
that it was necessary to inert the containment. Based on this
safety evaluation, the operating license was amended further giving
40twenty days for the plant's staff to complete the inerting operation.
On July 11, 1974 after preliminary hearings were conducted before
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (ALAB), a memorandum and
order were issued - stating that inerting was not justified
pending the outcome of a full hearing because the evidence presented
showed that inerting creates safety problems with greater conse-
quences than those it was intended to solve.4 1  On September 18, 1974,
the ALAB issued its final decision: the inerting requirement at
24
Vermont Yankee could not legally be imposed and the factual records
presented would not justify the inerting requirement.42 Finally
the Comissioners of the Atomic Energy Commission concluded on
November 7, 1974- that the non-inerted Vermont Yankee containment should
be preserved pending completion of the rule-making.43 On June 1, 1976,
a description of a containment air dilution (CAD) system designed by
Yankee engineers was sent to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.11
The system was installed in 1976 but until this day remains unlicensed
pending additional rule-makings. 2 0
I
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CHAPTER THREE
THE HYDROGEN GENERATION PROBLEM
The production of hydrogen during the course of an accident
presents two potential threats to containment integrity; first,
by increasing the internal gas pressure in the system and secondly,
by burning or exploding when combined with the oxygen present in the
containment atmosphere. The additional thermal energy produced in
the burning or detonation of the hydrogen raises the pressure
inside the containment and eventually can result in containment failure
by overpressurization.5
3.1 Mechanisms of Hydrogen Generation
Hydrogen can be produced during the course of a reactor accident
through high temperature metal-water reactions between fuel cladding
and reactor coolant, radiolytic decomposition of water, and corrosion
of metals by solutions used for emergency cooling or containment
sprays. The main source of hydrogen from metal-water reactions is
produced through the high-temperature zircalloy-water and steel-water
reactions. These reactions take place according to the following
reactions:
Zr + 2120 ZrO 2 + 2H2 + heat (3.1)
Fe(steel) + xH20 + Fe(steel) oxides + xH2 + heat (3.2)
Reaction (3.1) represents an initial source of hydrogen in a
meltdown and occurs when steam from water in the pressure vessel
contacts overheated zircalloy fuel cladding. It has been estimated
that the rate of consumption of zircalloy is about 10 per cent per
1000 seconds. Fig. 3.1 shows the zircalloy consumption as a function
26
a a Batelle Columbus Laboratory
b - Argonne National Laboratory
c - Phillips Petroleum Co.
d = General Electric Co.
e = assumed constant rate
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of time derived from a comparison of BWR core heatup calculations.44
Assuming a conservative constant comsumption rate, all zircalloy
would be consumed in less than three hours and could result in a 72%
hydrogen containment concentration (Fig. 3.2). Given that the amount
of steam decreases with time (Fig. 3.3), the rate of zircaloy consump-
tion will be lower but using a conservative approach, an upper
bound for the consumption rate can be assessed. Fig. 3.4 shows the
concentration of containment hydrogen for each class of reactor
containment as a function of the amount of metal-water reaction.
Steel-water reactions (eqn. 3.2) could generate massive amounts
of hydrogen. However, experimental studies indicate that iron or
steel must be nearly molten before appreciable reaction with steam
occurs. Contact between large amounts of molten steel and water
might cause steam explosions before the reaction could generate
hydrogen.
The radiolytic decomposition of water is a delayed but potentially
significant source of hydrogen. Beta or gamma radiation can cause
ionization and subsequent decomposition of water molecules resulting'
in hydrogen. However, the production of large amounts of hydrogen
in an accident would require that high radiation doses be applied to
large volumes of water; for example, in the range of 108 to 109 rads
applied to the entire water supply of the reactor. Since it would
require several days or weeks to accumulate such exposures, this
source of hydrogen is considered a long term rather than an
immediate problem. For BWR systems, it has been found that hydrogen
concentrations greater than four volume percent are possible from
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Figure 3.3 Steam Boil Off Rate vs. Accident Time
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Figure 3.4 Volume Percent Hydrogen in Containment vs.
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radiolysis, with a conservative estimate of the time to reach such
a limit of between 15 to 100 hours. 6
Protective coatings applied to the interior surfaces of
reactor containment facilities should react with the suppression
solutions because of extreme temperatures and radiation levels
after a design-basis accident. The probable reactions between
the spray solutions and the zinc-rich primer coat are:
Zn + OH~ + H 20 + HZnO2 + H2  (3.3)
Zn + 2H120 (steam) + Zn(OH)2 + H2  (3.4)
4Zn + 5/2 02 + 3120 + CO + Zn4CO3 (OH)6  (3.5)
Hydrogen evolution from these reactions could represent around
a 0.5 volume per cent increase in the hydrogen concentration in
the containment.
3.2 Properties of Hydrogen-Oxygen Mixtures
3.2.1 Flammability Limits
A flammable mixture of gases, such as hydrogen-oxygen, may
be'diluted with one of its constituents or with other gases until
it is no longer flammable. The marginal composition at which
such a mixture becomes flammable is defined as the "flammability
limit". A combustible gas mixture generally has an upper and
lower flammability limit. When the composition is between
these limits, the mixture will burn. Shapiro and Moffette esta-
blish the lower flammability limit for hydrogen in air as 4.1,
6 and 9 volume per cent for upward, horizontal and downward
propagation. Although the upper limits for horizontal and
downward propagation are somewhat smaller than the upper limit for
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upward propagation, these limits are not well established.
In this study, upper flammability limits are taken as 74 volume
percent as a conservative estimate. In all cases, flammability
limits are assumed to apply to gases maintained at atmospheric
pressure and room temperature, which may be saturated with vapor.
Limits vary with direction since convection currents produced by
hot expanding combustion products cause an upward gas movement
rather than a uniform ignition front.
It is important to specify the direction of flame propagation
when quoting flammability limits since conditions change over the
range. The rate of flame propagation is less than the rate at
which the flammable mixture rises due to strong convection
currents. According to Shapiro and Moffette7 , the effects of
water vapor mixtures in the flammability limits can be calculated
(Fig. 3.5). The upper and lower flammability limits converge
as the percentage of water vapor increases. As temperatures rise,
the water vapor content rises such that the lower flammability
limit rises slowly while the upper limit falls rapidly. When the
hydrogen-air-steam mixture reachs 60 percent. steam, the limits
coincide at about 10 percent hydrogen (Fig. 3.5).
Recent data indicates that the flammability region may actually
occur over a smaller range than previously predicted. General
Electric Co. conducted a series of hydrogen flammability tests
under conditions simulating post-LOCA BWR containment pressures,
temperatures and water vapor content (Table 3.1; Fig. 3.6).8
Results of these tests along with other data were used to establish
more flexible flammability limits. The current version of the NRC
33
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Regulatory Guide recommends that to avoid burning, four volume per-
cent of hydrogen should not be exceeded if more than five volume per-
4
cent is present. However, the percentage of hydrogen may increase to
six volume percent under the assumption that the excess two
volume percent hydrogen would partially burn in the containment given
more than five volume percent oxygen were present. The assump-
tions under which these limits are applied are explained in the
next section of this study.:
3.2.2 Hydrogen Deflagration and Detonation
Hydrogen combustion can vary from separated flames that
propagate upward, to coherent flames that propagate uniformly in
all direction at sub-sonic velocities, to supersonic detonation
waves. 8 Deflagration, or simple lurning, can produce effects
similar to those of explosions. Deflagration occurs as a chain
reaction in which the principal carriers are the free radicals H, 0,
and OH. Ignition occurs in a hydrogen-oxygen mixture when the rate
of production of the chain carriers exceeds the rate of their
destruction. Ignition can occur from sparks from electrical-
equipment or discharged accumulated static, or by temperature
increases. Sparks can ignite a mixture below the flammability limit
but the flames produced are not self-propagating and are extinguished
when the source of ignition is removed. The spontaneous ignition
temperature of a hydrogen-air mixture is 585 C although below this
temperature, a self-propagating flame can be produced in a four
volume percent mixture.7
The flame propagates at a velocity dependent upon its direction
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resulting from the tendency of the burned gas to rise, and from
the hydrogen concentration. Mixtures with compositions close
to the flammability limit will not burn all of the available
hydrogen. As the proportion of hydrogen in the mixture increases,
greater amounts of hydrogen are burned. For example, only half
of the hydrogen in a 5.6 volume percent mixture will burn.
Combustion will not be complete until the percentage of hydrogen
is increased to 10 percent or more.
Detonation is a rapid and violent process characterized by
a chemically supported shock wave. The velocity of wave propagation
is the same as the velocity of sound in the burning mixture.6 The
destructiveness of a detonation is due primarily to the destruction
of the shock front. Shapiro and Moffette show hydrogen detonation
7
limits to occur between 1:9 and 45 volume percent (Fig. 3.5); hydrogen
concentrations within this range will not necessarily detonate.
Experiments have shown that a detonation is more likely to occur
in tubes smaller than larger ones, and that a detonation wave can
be converted to that of normal combustion by suddenly widening
the tube. A strong initiating source is also required to produce
detonation. The use of flames or sparks does not produce detonation.
3.2.3 Effects of Hydrogen Burning On BWR Containments
Post-accident hydrogen generation can threaten containment
integrity if the hydrogen burns or detonates. Hydrogen burning
or detonation.may have a significant effect on the overall containment
pressure. The pressure rise due to combustion of hydrogen can be
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predicted from the burning rate, which depends on the geometry
of the vessel and velocity of the propagating flame. The
maximum possible pressure rise in a closed vessel can be determined
by assuming complete combustion of hydrogen with no heat losses
to the vessel walls.8 The combustion energy is absorbed by the
mixture of combustion products. The overall energy balance is:
.AU - Cn (T - T)nH ]A&U (3.6)
v f 0 o 2.
where:
[R2]= mole fraction of hydrogen
n - total moles of initial mixture
T = initial temperature before combustion
Auo - combustion energy per mole of hydrogen
AU = internal energy difference
u = total moles of final mixture
C, average specific heat at constant volume
Tf = temperature of the final mixture
Assuming ideal gas behavior, the ratio of the final pressure Pf
to the initial pressure P is:-
Pf af Tf (3.7)
P n0  o T0
Solving for T from equation (3.6) and substituting into equationf
(3.7) gives the maximum pressure rise as:
This Pf 
i p Au 
ai 2  tn
I O mxP T7o+no (3.8)
This result is plotted against the initial percentage of hydrogen
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for initial water vapor concentrations (Fig. 3.7). This model
can be used to predict the pressure transients associated with
burning of various concentrations. The pressure transients in
a Mark I drywell for hydrogen concentrations of up to 18 volume
percent is shown in Fig. 3.8.
3.3 Methods for Hydrogen Control in Boiling Water Reactors
Several systems have been proposed to control flammable
hydrogen-oxygen mixtures. Systems are designed to maintain
hydrogen produced in metal-water reactions below the flammability
limits established by the regulatory guides (four volume percent
hydrogen concentration and five percent volume oxygen). 4,l4
Most Mark I and Mark II containments' atmospheres are required
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to be inerted with nitrogen (the
3
exceptions are the Vermont Yankee and Hatch-2 units). Other
methods include combinations of air dilution systems, recombiners
and/or controlled venting. In order 'to understand the differences
between BWR containment design, these designs are now described,
followed by detailed descriptions of hydrogen control systems..
3.3.1 BWR Containments
Boiling Water Reactor containments have been designed using
the pressure suppression concept. Three basic types have evolved,
starting with the bulb-shaped Mark I, evolving to the conical-
shaped Mark II,I and ending finally with the multibarrier pressure
containment type Mark III design.35 The Mark I primary containment
consists of a drywell, a pressure suppression chamber, and a
connecting vent system between the drywell and the suppression chamber.
In the event of a pipe break within the drywell, reactor water and
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ITable 3.2
CHARACTERISTICS OF LWR CONTAINMENTS
CONTAINMENT TYPE
DRY
SUBATMOSPHERIC
ICE CONDENSER
PRESSSURE SUPPRESSION
MARK I (DRYWELL)
(WETWELL)
MARK 1I (DRYWELL)
(WE TWELL)'
MARK III (DRYWELL)
(WE TWELL)
DESIGNER
BECHTEL, DUKE PWR.
BECHTEL, EBASCO
BECHTEL
STONE & WEBSTER
WESTINGHOUSE
GE
GE
GE
MATERIAL
STEEL
CONCRETE
CONCRETE
CONCRETE
CONCRETE
(R)
(P)
(R)
(R)
STEEL
STEEL
CONCRETE (R)
W/STEEL LINER
CONCRETE (R)
CONCRETE (R)
W/STEEL LINER
DESIGN
PRESSURE
(PSIA)
55-62
70
70
60
27
74
74
65
65
45
30
VOLUME
(FT3)
2.5 x 106
2.5 x 106
2.0 x 106
2.3 x 106
1.25 x106
159,000
204,000
184,000
209,000
280,000
1.5 x 106
.Is
N
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steam will be released into the drywell. The resulting increase
in pressure will force a mixture of steam, water and air into the
suppression chamber via the vents.33
The drywell is a steel pressure vessel with a spherical
lower portion about 62 feet in diameter and a cylindrical upper
portion 33 feet in diameter. The drywell houses the reactor vessel,
reactor coolant recirculation system, and other pipes related to
the cooling system. The drywell is enclosed in four to five foot
thick reinforced concrete for shielding purposes. Design pressure
and volume of typical BWR containments are shown in Table 3.2 for
comparative purposes.
The pressure suppression chamber is a steel pressure vessel
in the shape of a torus that encircles. the base of the drywell.
3
The torus houses approximately 7.8x10 cubic feet of water and has
a net air space of approximately 108xlO cubic feet. The Mark I
containment is located inside the reactor building. This building
forms part of the secondary containment system, along with the
standby gas treatment system (SGTS) and other auxiliary equipment.
The Mark 1 primary containment consists of a drywell,
pressure suppression chamber, connecting vents, a venting and
vacuum relief system, containment cooling systems and other service
equipment. The drywell forms a truncated cone, and the cylin-
drical pressure suppression chamber is immediately below. These
two units comprise a structurally integrated reinforced concrete
pressure vessel. The drywell and the suppression pool are separated
by a reinforced concrete floor. The primary containment is struc-.
turally separated from the surrounding reactor building. Design
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pressure and volume of the Mark II primary containment are
shown in Table 3.2.
The Mark III primary containment is a steel cylinder with
torispherical head. The drywell is a cylindrical structure with
reinforced walls and roof.35 The functions of the drywell are
to provide shielding to reduce radiation levels in the containment
to levels which permit normal access, provide structure to support
the upper pool, and to channel the steam release from a loss of
coolant accident through horizontal vents for condensation in the
suppression pool. The suppression pool is a 360* annular pool
located between the weir wall inside the drywell, and the contain-
ment wall on the bottom floor of the reactor building. The
suppression pool provides a heat sink for safety relief valve
operation,' a heat sink for hot-standby operation, a means to
condense. steam released in the drywell .during a LOCA, and a source
of water for the emergency core cooling system. The entire volume
of the containment' is open to the suppression pool. Design pressure
and volume of the Mark III primary containment are shown in Table 3.2.
The Mark III containment provides a number of advantages over
the Mark I and Mark II containments; Fig. 3.9 shows a comparison
of the size and form of the three containment types. The advantages
are reduced overall reactor building height, improved seismic
response, improved accessibility for installation and inspection
of nuclear boiler piping and equipment, and improved pipe whip
protection.35 However, the lower containment design pressure
makes the Mark III containment more vulnerable to hydrogen burning.
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3.3.2 The Containment Inerting System (CIS)
Cotaiment inerting consists of purging the containment
atmosphere with nitrogen until the oxygen concentration is below
five volume percent; the reactor is then operated under those
conditions. If the hydrogen concentration is kept below this limit,
hydrogen generated is unable to burn or explode. In the event of
hydrogen generation d.uring an accident, a nitrogen make-up
system is activated to help reduce the hydrogen concentration to
four volume percent and maintain the oxygen concentration below
five volume percent. Controlled venting through the standby gas
treatment system (SGTS) is provided to reduce the pressure inside
12the containment. The containment inerting system (CIS) at
Pilgrim nuclear power station is analyzed in detail in Chapter 4.
3.3.3 The Containment Air Dilution-System (CAD)
In the containment air dilution system (CAD), the atmosphere
in the containment is diluted with air during or after an
accident.9  In this system, hydrogen concentration becomes the
parameter of concern. System design is based on the requirement
that the containment atmosphere be maintained below four volume
percent hydrogen in the event of an accident. The system monitors
the hydrogen gas concentration and injects additional air as
required to dilute the hydrogen and maintain it below the
flammability limit. Controlled venting is manually initiated
when, during an accident, the pressure reaches half the drywell
design pressure of 28 psig.1 1 The CAD system in use at the Vermont
Yankee nuclear power station is analyzed in detail in Chapter 4.
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3.3.4 Controlled Venting
Venting of the containment atmosphere occurs only if after
an accident, the hydrogen concentration approaches four volume
percent. Venting times are designed on the basis of dose
acceptability.10 Fission product releases are minimized by
passing the vented gas through chemical scrubbers or charcoal
filters in the standy gas treatment system. However, control of
noble gas radioactivity under venting conditions is very difficult.6
3.3.5 Recombiners
If venting is deemed unacceptable, there are a variety of
non-venting recombiner schemes available. Chemical recombination
of hydrogen is a way to prevent hydrogen burning and at the same
time control increases in hydrogen pressure. Applied to BWRs,
recombiners would need to be more complex and expensive, requiring
a supplementary oxygen supply to consume all the hydrogen that
might be produced. Recombiners can be classified into flame,
catalytic and electrical types.6 The principal disadvantages of
recombiners is the possibility of extinguishing the flame and
having it "flash back" through the injector. Catalytic recombiners
use a catalytic bed that dilutes the gas mixture below the flamma-
bility limits and are now in use in PWRs. Recent designs include
nickel and nickel-chromiun oxide combinations supported on
aluminum-oxide bases and platinized honeycomb ceramic disks. 6
Disadvantages include choice of diluent, condensing or non-
condensing reactions, catalyst, preheat temperature, pressure-
drop specifications, vessel materials and number of recombining
stages. Electric recombiners use electric resistance heaters
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heat the continuous flow of containment atmosphere to above
the hydrogen-oxygen reaction temperature (Fig. 3.10). A
comparative analysis of the air dilution system and the inerting
system is made in the next chapter in order to find out the
influence on the probability of containment failure due to post-
accident hydrogen generation.
EXMALST
Figure 3.10 Electric Hydrogen Recombiner
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CHAPTER FOUR
QUANTIFICATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF CONTROLLING
POST-ACCIDENT HYDROGEN IN BWRs
In order to assess the overall probability that the CAD or the
CIS systems are capable of handling a given amount of hydrogen
generated during an accident, a set of probabilities need to be
calculated.
4.1 Overview of the Probabilistic Framework of Analysis
A hydrogen related event tree is developed in order
to assess the sequence of events that can lead to the uncovering
of the core and the production'df hydrogen, perhaps eventually
leading to meltdown (see section 4.2). A fault tree analysis is
used here to calculate the probabilities of failure on demand
(Pf(S)) of the CAD and CIS hydrogen control systems (see section 4.3).
Using probabilities of failure of each system, the probability
that the system is available to work (P C(S) and P (S)) areCAD CIS
defined as follows:
(S) I - P(S) (4.1)
PCIS(S) - P f(S) (4.2)
The next step in the analysis is to calculate the probability of
hydrogen generation (or percent metal-water reaction) given that
an accident occurs (P(A)) (Fig. 4.1). From WASH-1400, large
LOCA accidents in BWRs have a probability of producing a core melt
of ~3x105 / reactor year.45 For these accidents, it is assumed
that all the zirconium reacts with water to produce hydrogen.
For small accidents with probabilities in the range of 3x103
reactor-year, it- is assumed that the metal-water reaction linearly
decreases from about 100% to almost zero and remains zero over the
100
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range of the higher probability yet less serious accidents.
The hydrogen generation rate is important because it affects
the probability that the control system is physically capable of
maintaining the combustible mixture below the flammability limits.
The maximum hydrogen rate physically achievable over an hour is
calculated from core heatup calculations. Fig. 3.1 shows the
amount of cladding that reacts as a function of time derived from
comparing different heatup curves.44 The figure shows a 10%
cladding reaction per every 1000 seconds. Extrapolating this curve
np to 100%, all the zirconium is consumed in about three hours
(Fig. 3.2). This is a very conservative assumption since- the amount
of steam decreases with time according to the steam availability
curve used in the above calculations (Fig. 3.3). However, this
value is used here as an upper bound on the hydrogen generation
rate.
The maximum amount of hydrogen produced by a metal-water
reaction is shown ,in Fig. 3.4. For a 100% metal-water reaction, the
maximum volume percent in a BWR Mark I containment is 72%.
Using the same figure, the percent metal water reaction required
to have four volume percent hydrogen concentration achieved in
four or five minutes, implying a generation tate between 144x103
and 180x103 cubic feet per hour. These values are the upper
bound of the generation rate plotted in Fig. 4.2. The accident
at Three Mile Island generated hydrogen at approximately
100x103 cubic feet per hour (Fig. 4.2).
The CAD system is designed to work when the hydrogen
(VY) CAD
(Pil) CIS .
(PB) CIS--------
10 103 o 10
Hydrogen Generation Rate (cubic feet/hour) 8'
Probability of Accidents/reactor-year
Probability of CAD and CIS Systems7 to Control Hydrogen vs. Hydrogen Generation Rate
0
o
o H
~
'in
x
Ill-A.p1~
OQI
0
0
1
-%
0
4-A
4
1
.5
U)
4-)
.1-I
'4
4-i
-'-4
'-4
,0
"3
'-I
C)0c
3x10-3
'A
C)
3x10~4 3x10-5
LAI
wi
F1gure 42
concentration reaches four volume percent which.in the design
basis accident occurs in -approximately nineteen hours. If
a generation rate of 631.5 cubic feet/hour is assumed, up to this
point the probability of success of the CAD is the one from
equation 4.1 (P f(S) from fault tree analysis). During normal
operations, the CAD system pressurizes the containment to
reduce the hydrogen concentration, and then vents through the
Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) to reduce the pressure.
(The maximum venting rate is 2400 cubic feet/ hour). If a
generation rate reaches four volume percent in one hour (i.e.
12,000 cubic feet/hour), this corresponds to a probability of
accident of 3x10~4 /reactor year. As the hydrogen generation rate
increases, -the probability of accident decreases. For these
low probability accidents, the probability of the CAD system being
able to handle high H2 rates drops almost to zero. 'For the CIS,
the probability of controlling the hydrogen remains about
constant since having no oxygen to react, the hydrogen would not
burn. (This assumes that the reactor is inerted during operations).
However, during the 24 hour period prior to shutdown and after
startup, the reactor is not inerted, which means that the probability
of having a combustible mixture is decreased during this time
because the oxygen concentration is above five volume percent.
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4.2 Hydrogen Related Event Tree
The design basis LOCA in a BWR is defined as a double-ended
5
rupture of the primary coolant recirculation line (WASd-1400)
A small LOCA is defined as a break in the cooling system of about
1/2 to 2 inches in diameter. The sequences of events for both
large and small LOCAs is very similar; the differences are in the
emergency coolant injection requirements. The event tree that is
developed here is a reduced event tree with emphasis on those
sequences that lead to hydrogen generation and eventually to
failure of the containment due to hydrogen overpressurization (Fig. 4.3).
In this study, the initiating event is assumed a random rupture
in the reactor coolant system. The next event in the sequence is
failure of the electric power followed by failure of the reactor
protection system that provides the reactor trip in case of an
accident. The next event is failure of the vapor .suppression
system. If the vapor suppression system fails, the primary
containment fails due to overpressurization. The next event is
failure of the emergency coolant recirculation systems. Failure
of these systems would leave the core uncovered long enough to
produce significant amounts of hydrogen.
A separate event tree is developed showing the sequence of
events required to handle the hydrogen. Fig. 4.4 shows the
event tree for the containment air dilution system and Fig. 4.5
shows the event tree for the containment inerting system.
Both trees are basically the same; the difference is in the
probability of both systems to handle the hydrogen generated.
The first column in the event tree is the control system
LOCA INI1IATION: ELECTRIC REACTOR VAPOR EMERGENCY POST-ACCIDENT EMERGENCY
RECIRCULATION POWER PROTECTION SUPPRESSION COOLANT HEAT REMOVAL COOLANT
LINE BREAKS SYSTEM SYSTEM INJECTION SYSTEM RECIRCULATION
A B C F G
No consequences
Core uncovered
enough to
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Consequences are
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Figure 4.3 Hydrogen Related BWR LOCA Event Tree
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(CAD or CIS); if this system is not used or fails to work, it is
assumed that the hydrogen is not controlled. If the system works
and is used, the possibility exists that the system can control the
gas mixture. If the combustible mixture is not controllable, 'the next
event in the sequence will be hydrogen burning. The following
sequences apply to both branches (use of the system or not).
If hydrogen burns, the next sequence is containment failure due
to over pressurization by hydrogen burning. If there is no rupture
or no hydrogen burning, the hydrogen concentration could increase
to the detonation limits (20 percent) and explode. The final
event is containment rupture by detonation. Fig.' 4.4 and Fig. 4.5
show the sequence of events that could lead to radioactive releases
in the case of containment failure.
Assuming the combustible mixture is controlled and there is
no containment failure, the core could remain uncovered increasing,
the rate of hydrogen production building up radiation. Fig..4.6 shows
the event tree related to the uncovered core. If the core continues
to stay uncovered, eventually it will start to melt and other
events will dominate the hydrogen problem (i.e. steam explosions, etc.).
The different stages in Fig. 4.6 affect the probabilities of
the hydrogen control evqpt trees (Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.5). In
order to assess the probability that the CAD or CIS systems can
handle hydrogen generated in an, accident, a detailed .analysis
of both systems is next attempted.
ICORE UNCOVERED CORE REMAINS CORE REMAINS
ENOUGH TO UNCOVERED: UNCOVERED:
PRODUCE HYDROGEN HYDROGEN + CORE START
RADIATION TO MELT
0 P Q
-0 "HigW'hydrogen generation rate
OQ "Mediunf'hydrogen generation rate
-OP "Low" hydrogen generation rate
Figure 4.6 Uncovered Core Event Tree 0
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4.3 Fault Tree Analysis of Hydrogen Control System
4.3.1 Analysis of the Containment Air Dilution System
The purpose of this analysis is to identify and evaluate the
potential failure modes of the CAD system shown in Fig. 4.7.
The weak points of the system are examined. Failure probabilities
associated with the CAD system were derived using data supplied
by Vermont Yankee and the failure data used in WASH-140031,
3 2
Fault trees are used in this analysis because they provide
a convenient and efficient method for the computation of system
failure probability and also lead to discovery of all possible
failure combinations. The failure probability of the CAD system
is used in the calculation of the overall probability of the
control system to handle hydrogen. Any other information from the
fault tree analysis is useful in evaluating the weak points
of the system, permitting redesign to improve system reliability.
In order to understand the development of the fault tree, the
important aspects of the CAD system are now described.
The CAD system is designed to limit hydrogen concentration in the
11
containment to less than four volume percent following a LOCA.
The CAD system consists of three systems: a sampling subsystem, air
injection subsystem, and a venting subsystem. A schematic
diagram of the sample subsystem is shown in Fig. 4.8. It consists
of two hydrogen analyzer cells, redundant air pumps, an air-to-air
heat exchanger, pipes and valves. These components are connected
to the drywell and torus at four different sampling points
including a common return line to the torus. 1 The primary
analyzer is located inside the reactor building and is remotely
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operated from a read-out from the CAD system panel located in the
back of the control room. The floor arrangement of a typical BWR
control room is shown in Fig. 4.9, indicating the location of the
CAD system panels. The CAD system panel A is shown in Fig. 4.10.
The read-out from the primary analyzer is given in percent hydrogen
concentration in the containment. A redundant analyzer is mounted
on a wall outside the reactor building in an area which is
11
accessible following a LOCA . The read-out is expressed in
"percent LEV" and the start mechanism is located on this wall
at such a position that it has to be reached using a portable
ladder that is reclined against the wall.
The heat exchanger, a passive component, conditions the sample
for analysis. The sample flow force is provided by two redundant
air pups for both hydrogen analyzers. The accuracy of the analyzers
is provided by manual calibration equipment. The valves of the
sample supply and sample return are controlled from the CAD panels.
These are normally open, and if they do not receive a Primary
Containment Isolation Signal (PCIS), they fail close on loss of power.
These valves are used only to select an appropriate sample point.
A second line leads to a radiation monitor which is isolated fron
the subsystem and the containment by solenoid valves that close on
receipt of a PCIS signal or loss of power.
A schematic diagram of the injection subsystem is shown in Fig.
4.11. It consists of two completely independent injection
Figure 4.9 Floor Arrangement of a Typical BWR Control Room with Location of CAD System Panels Indicated
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flow paths. Each path consists of a motor driven air compressor
located inside the reactor building. Air can be pumped into either
the drywell and/or the torus11 . Each compressor is rated at 41
standard cubic feet per minute at a discharge pressure of 30 psig.
Power requirements for the compressor, valve operators, and instru-
mentation constitute a train which is power supplied by one of the
plant emergency diesel generators; the other diesel generator
supplies the redundant train. Each train has a piping connection
outside the reactor building to allow the use of portable compressors
in case of failure of the main compressors. All valves and
compressors are manually operated from the CAD system panels
located in the control room. During normal plant operation, injection
valves are closed and receive a PCIS signal. On loss of power, the
solenoid operated isolation valves fail in the closed position.26
The vent subsystem consists of piping, instrumentation, motors,
and solenoid-operated valves arranged to provide two independent
flow paths, one from the drywell and one from the torus (Fig. 4.12).
Each path is connected to the SGTS. Flow in each path is regulated
by motor operated valves from the control room. All valves are
11
normally closed until receiving a pCIS signal. On loss of
power, the solenoid valves in the subsystem fail in the closed
position whereas the motor operated valves fail in the position
they are at the moment of loss of power.
The CAD system was designed assuming accident conditions
that would involve hydrogen generation from only 1.3% of the
active zirconium in the core interacting with steam. This value
was assumed by applying a factor of five to the projected
p
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calculated value of 0.26%9. The maximum hydrogen concentration
calculated as a function of time is shown in Fig. 4.13 based on
Vermont Yankee calculations. After a design basis LOCA, the
hydrogen concentration could reach four volume percent in about
19 hours, assuming a 1.3% metal-water reaction. In order to
prevent the increase in hydrogen concentration, a hydrogen analyzer
would be activated. After a thirty minute warm-up period, the
hydrogen concentration can be measured.20 The analyzer is used'
to monitor the hydrogen concentration in the drywell. Once the
concentration reaches 3.2 volume percent in either the drywell or
torus, an air compressor is activated which can dilute the contain-
ment atmosphere at a rate of 40 cubic feet per minute.
The hydrogen concentration will continue to increase due to
radiolysis approaching the four volume percent limit and will
26level off two days after pressurization has begun.2 The compressor
will continue to run until the pressure inside the containment reaches
28 psig, half of the containment design pressure. Following this
procedure, the hydrogen concentration should decrease to about 3.5
volume percent. As hydrogen continues to be generated, the concen-
tration will approach 3.7 volume percent and the containment will
be vented. The venting rate is 20 cubic feet per minute.
Venting does not decrease the hydrogen concentration because the
hydrogen generated by radiolysis increases faster than it can be
removed by venting. When hydrogen reaches four volume percent and
the pressure has decreased to less than 28 psig, pressurization will
begin and continue until the pressure increases to 28 psig and
the hydrogen concentration decreases. The pressurization and
SBegin Vent
at 40 cfm
11, concentration
and Torus due to
and 1.3 % Zr-1!.0O
in the drywall
radiolysis
Reaction
1V
Pressurization
I'll
H2 concentration if
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Figure 4.13 Hydrogen Concentration vs..Time After an Accident (Containment Air Dilution System)
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continuous venting cycle will continue as long as necessary.
The fluctuation of hydrogen concentration during the process
is shown in Fig. 4.13. The CAD system can also be operated without
hydrogen analysis. The compressor can be started within seven
hours following a design basis LOCA and continue to run until the
pressure reaches 28 psig. At this point, the compressor is stopped
and one day later, the containment is vented. After a 24 hour
venting period, the compressor cycle can begin again and continue
as long as necessary; venting also continues during this time.
The fault tree for the CAD system describes the different
ways the system could fail to control post-accident generated
hydrogen (Fi'g. 4.14). It is used to calculate the probability
of failure of the CAD system to work when required, which is used
later.in the overall probability calculation. The following
assumptions were made in the analysis: (i) independent component
failures were considered (except where noted); (ii) electric power
is assumed during, the time of the accident; events where electric
power or diesel-generators are required, refer to local electric
service; (iii) the SGTS is assumed operational when required;
-iv) the probability of air compressor failure refers to initial
usage, with availability assumed to decrease during the cycling
process; (v) the rare' event approximation is used except where
noted; (vi) the work "containment" refers to the primary containment
(the drywell plus torus); (vii) all failure probabilities are
placed on a "per demand" basis and refer to component unavailability
or human error; these values are assumed independent of time; and
(viii) point values are used from fixed data and error propagation
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is from log normal distribution following the procedures of WASH-1400. 3 1
The first step in developing a fault tree is to define a
top event, which is the most undesirable event postulated to occur.
For the CAD system, the top event is defined as the failure of the
system to maintain the hydrogen concentration below the NRC mandated
flammability limit of 4 volume percent. This event may occur if
the injection subsystem fails to provide air to the containment as
required after the generation of hydrogen in an accident. The
failure probability of the injection subsystem could be increased
if the sample subsystem fails to detect correctly the hydrogen
concentration. In this case, the operator would not know when to
correctly start the air compressors, since the hydrogen concentration
must reach 3.3 volume peicent before operator action can be initiated.
The compressors could physically be run without knowing the correct
hydrogen concentration, but the effectiveness of maintaining the.
hydrogen concentration below the flammability limit would:signifi-
cantly decrease. The failure of the sample subsystem'is due to
the failure of the hydrogen analyzers to detect the hydrogen con-
centration (Fig. 4.15), or to the failure of the component pipes,
valves, pumps due to malfunction or operator error. The two
redundant hydrogen analyzers could fail due to improper calibration.
In this case, the concentration recorded would be incorrect.
Another failure mode is the failure of the analyzer to start due
to malfunction or operator error to start the analyzer.
The injection system can fail because of failure of the system
air compressors, and the unavailability of a portable compressor
that could be connected to the system in the case of failure of the
SAMPLE SUSSYS'E0t
FAILS TO DETECT
lYDROGEN CONCENTRATION
HYDROGEN ANALYZER
WORKS BUT THERE IS
NO SAM4PLE FLOW
a
VALVES DETUEEI -
CONTAIIlIENT A1D IYDIOGEN
AJIALY2ER CLOSED
- PIPES
DET!IEEN
CONTAIlR4EL'tT AND,
HYDtOCE1 AIIALYZE
PLIJGED
Ji
.I SAVIPLE PUMPS FAIL TO
DELIVER SAZ-PLE FLO'.
VALVES BET.E-EN
COiIAIIlEj!T A11D 11YDI OGEII
Al'ALYII:ER U1RO11C POSITION1
Figure 4.15 Fault Tree of Sample Subsystem
(Containment Air Dilution System)
III
L I
112
L2
£13
a'
PRI:IARY HYDROGEN ANIALYZER
FAILS TO DETECT
IIYDRlO'1GI CO:ICENTIATIO"
SECOIIDARY HYDROGEN5
ANALYZER FAILS TO DETECT
IIYDROGEtI CO:ECEIVTRATIoff
P
SECOUDARY IIYDIIOGEII
,LYZER FAILS TO START
AS REQpUIItEI)
Q1 III R2
Figure 4.15 Fault Tree of Sample System (Containment Air Dilution System)
(Continuation)
-.4
-a
EVENT PROBABILITIES
Table 4.1
USED IN CONTAINMENT AIR DILUTION SYSTEM
FAULT TREEZ
EVENT DESCRIPTION FAILURE PER DEMAND
Loss of Power 1x10-6
Valves drywell 
-10
wrong position >lxlo0
Valves torus 10
wrong position >1x10~
Operator error:
at leat one valve 
-10per line >1x10
Operator fails to 
-2
stop compressor 1x10 2
Compressor fails. to 
_4
stop 1x10
Sample pump failure 1x10 3
Hydrogen analyzer 
-6
wrong concentration 1x106
Operator fails to start 
-2
primary hydrogen analyzer 1x10 2
Operator fails to start
secondary hydrogen analyzer 3x10 1
Hydrogen analyzer start mechanism
mechanism failure 1x10''
Portable compressor
unavailable when needed 1x10 1
No power from diesel- O2generator 3x10
Compressor fails to start 1210-3
Operator fails to start 
-2
compressor 1-- lx10 2
Operator fails to start
compressor 2 1x10
*Error factor is to be used to multiply failure per
upper bound, and to divide
ERROR FACTOR*
30
10
10
3
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
demand to obtain the
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principal compressors. However, if at least one of the available
compressors work, failure could still occur due to failure of the
air to flow into the containment due to a rupture or plug of the
connecting air pipes, or valves in wrong position. The failure
of the main compressors is dependent upon one or more of the following
events occurring: power failure, malfunction of the compressors,
operator failure to start the compressors, or failure of the
analyzers to perform on demand.
31
Using component failure data from WASH-14003, the fault tree
was used to quantify the CAD system probability of failure of
demand (Table 4.1). The results show that the CAD system has a
median probability of failure on demand of 1.6xl0-3 with a lower
bound of 1.6x10~4 and an upper bound of 1.6x10-2 . This means that
there exists an approximate 99.8% probability that the CAD system
would be able to maintain the hydrogen concentration below the
flammability limit for those accident sequences that result in
a design basis hydrogen generation rate corresponding to a 1.3%
metal-water reaction (approximately 1000 cubic feet hydrogen .per
hour).
4.3.2 Anilysis of Containment Inerting System
The purpose of the containment inerting system (CIS) is to
provide nitrogen into the. primary containment in order to reduce
or maintain the oxygen concentration of the drywell and the
suppression pool below five percent during normal plant operation,
and to reduce post-accident hydrogen concentration below four
percent. The containment inerting system to be analyzed here is that
80
which is installed at the Pilgrim 1 Nuclear Power Station in
Plymouth, Massachusetts operated by the Boston Edison Electric
Company. The purpose of this analysis is the same as that of the
containment air dilution (CAD) system analyzed earlier; that is, to
identify and evaluate potential failure modes, system weak points,
and how they can lead to undesirable events. Failure probabilities
of the CIS were derived using the information supplied by Boston
Edison personnel and the fault tree methodology and failure data
used in WASH-1400.31 ,32 The probability of failure of the
containment inerting system was used in the containment event tree
to determine its contribution to the overpressurization failure of
the containment due to hydrogen generation, and for comparison with
the containment air dilution system. In order to understand the
development of fault tree, the subsystems of the containment inerting
system are described including inerting and deinerting and operation
during potential accidents.
The inerting system consists of three subsystems designed to
function as follows: (i) initial purging of the primary containment
within 24 hours after startup, (ii) providing a supply of make-up
nitrogen during accidents that produce hydrogen and (iii) providing
a way to sample the drywell and torus for oxygen concentration and
the drywell for hydrogen concentration. These subsystems are
described below;
A schematic diagram of the purging and make-up system
is shown in Fig. 4.16. The purging subsystem consists of two
connections for liquid nitrogen supplied by trucks, a nitrogen
00
F~igure 4.16 Diagram of the Purge anti Make-up Subsystem (Containment Inertilig System)
I
purge vaporizer, a set of valves, pipes to the drywell and torus
and an air supply system. The make-up subsystem consists of valves
a cryogenic tank of liquid nitrogen, a connection for the liquid
nitrogen, and an ambient air vaporizer. The subsystem is connected to
the drywell and torus via the purge subsystem pipes (Fig. 4.16).
The sample subsystem consists of an oxygen analyzer connected to
seven sampling-points located in the drywell (3), torus (2),
drywell exhaust (1), and torus exhaust (1) and to two return lines,
one from the drywell and one from the torus. The oxygen analyzer
is monitored from the control room back panels, and is in continuous
service during plant operations because of a cold-start eight hour
warm-up period. Two hydrogen analyzers provide samples from the
drywell and are in standby condition at all times during operation
(Fig. 4.17).
During the inerting process, the suppression pool is purged
until the oxygen concentration is reduced to below four vol;me percent.
The vent valves remain open until the purge valves are closed.
The nitrogen flow is regulated to keep the lines from freezing,
which happens when the flow of the cooled gas is increased too
rapidly. Once the oxygen concentration .In the suppression chamber
is set below four volume percent, nitrogen flow is established to
the drywell until a four volume percent oxygen content is reached.
During this process, the nitrogen make-up system valves are closed
and a SGTS train is activated.
Nitrogen can be added to the drywell or suppression chamber
during normal operations. In case of hydrogen generation, the
Figure 4.17 Diagram of Sample Subsystem (Containment Inerting System)
primary containment must be isolated and the SGTS placed in service
(Fig. 4.18). When the hydrogen concentration approaches four
volume percent, the nitrogen make-up system valves are open
to add nitrogen to the primary containment. The nitrogen addition
is stopped when the hydrogen concentration falls below two volume
percent. When and if the hydrogen concentration should increase
again to the four volume percent level and when the containment
pressure reaches the design pressure of 45 psig, the containment
is vented through the SGTS to lower the primary containment
pressure. During venting, the nitrogen make-up system adds
nitrogen to the containment to maintain low oxygen levels.
Venting and nitrogen addition are stopped when the hydrogen
concentration is reduced to below three volume percent.
In order to deinert the primary containment after reactor
shutdown, the nitrogen make-up system and purge system are
closed. Then, the purge exhaust valves are opened as well as
the air purge inlet valves to allow air flow. When the drywell air
sample shows an oxygen content greater than 19 volume perceit,
drywell entry can then safely be made by plant personnel in order
to make necessary repairs and reconnaissance.
The fault tree for the containment inerting system (CIS) was
developed in the same fashion as that for the CAD system
*The decision to vent the containment during an accident would be
left to upper-management utility officials, according to
operators at-Pilgrim 1.
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Figure 4.18 Diagram of the Vent Subsystem (Containment Inerting System)
Oo
Ln
86
(see section 4.3.1). The fault tree describes the different ways
in which the inerting system could fail to control post-accident
generated hydrogen (Fig. 4.19, 4.20). During the construction of
the tree, the assumptions made followed those noted (i) to (vii)
for the CAD system, with the change in assumption (iv), i.e.;
the containment is inerted at the time of the accident, reflecting.
the attributes of the CIS system.
The first step in developing the fault tree is the definition
of the most undesirable event or top event. For the inerting
system, the top event is the failure to maintain the oxygen and
hydrogen mixture below NRC mandated flammability limits. The
inerting system prevents a flammable mixture from developing by
maintaining the oxygen concentration below five volume percent;
a make-up system is used during an accident to maintain the
oxygen below five volume percent. Failure of the make-up system can
therefore lead to the top event occurring. A failure of the sample
subsystem to detect' both oxygen or hydrogen concentration conditions
the probability of failure of the makeup system since the operator
will not be able to open the valves of the make-up system when
required because the gas concentrations are unknown. Failure of
the operator to open the make-up valves or failure of the valves
themselves leads to the event that the nitrogen make-up valves
fail to open as required. This event, along with the unavailability
of nitrogen in the system, leads to the failure of the make-up
system to deliver nitrogen as required to the containmept.
Nitrogen can also become unavailable due to the rupture of the
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cryogenic make-up tank, a break in the pipes connecting the
tank to the containment, freezing (plugging) of the pipes, and/or
lack of nitrogen due to unavailability of delivery trucks.
Using the failure data from WASH-140032 (Table 4.2) the tree
was quantified. The results show a median probability of failure on
demand of 1.3xlO-, with a lower bound of 1x10 3 and an upper bound
of 1x10 1 . If the CIS has-a redundant nitrogen make-up system,
as in the case of the Peach Bottom nuclear power plant25, the
mean probability of failure on demand is reduced to 1.04xlO with
an upper bound of lxlO-2 and lower bound of lx10~.
4.4 Final Results: Probability of Post-Accident Hydrogen Control
Using the probabilities calculated in previous sections, the
final overall probability that the CAD and the CIS systems are
. capable of handling a given amount of hydrogen can be assessed.
From the fault tree analysis (Section 4.3), the probability of
failure of the systems (Pf(S)) are:
-P (S)CAD '1.6x10-3  (Vermont Yankee) (4.3)
Pf(S)CIs = 1.3x10 2 ( Pilgrim 1) (4.4)
Pf(S)CIS 1.04x10- 3 (Peach Bottom) (4.5)
Where the probability that the system is available to work
PCAD(S) and PCIS(S)) is:
PCAD S) = 1 - 1.6x10-3 = 0.9984 (Vermont Yankee) (4.6)
PCIs(S) 1 - 1.3x10-2 = 0.9870 (Pilgrim 1) (4.7)
PCIS(S) = 1 - 1.04lO 3 = 0.9989 (Peach Bottom) (4.8)
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Table 4.2
EVENT PROBABILITIES USED IN CONTAINMENT INERTING SYSTEM
FAULT TREE
EVENT DESCRIPTION
Valves between
containment and
make-up subsystem
closed
Oxygen analyzer failure
Operator error: at
least one valve per line
Loss of Power:all valves
closed
Operator fails to open
make-up valves
Make-up valves fails
to open as required
Nitrogen line frezzes
Cryogenic tank breaks
No LN2 trucks supply
Hydrogen analyzer failure
AILURE PER DEMAND
1X10-6
1x10-6
>x -10>1x10 0
1x10
-2
lxlO_1x10 4
3x10 8
lxl0 8
3x10-3
lx10-2
ERROR FACTOR*
10
30
10
10
*10
10
10
10
*Error factor is to be used to multiply failure per demand
upper bound, and to divide it to obtain the lower bound.
to obtain the
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Table 4.3 indicates the probabilities assumed in this cal-
culation. The hydrogen generation rate is discretized into
"high", "medium" and "low" categories (180x10 3 cu. ft. /hr.).
For the "high" generation rate (upper bound of Fig. 4.6),
12xlO 3 cu.ft./hr. for "medium" (generation rate to reach four
volume percent hydrogen in one hour in a Mark I containment).
(The TMI hydrogen generation rate of ~ 10Ox10 3 cu.ft./in.
is located between the "high" and "medium" category.)
For the low H2 generation rate, 631.5 cu.ft./hr. based on the
Vermont Yankee CAD design basis accident is used. In order
to assess the probability that the CAD system can control the
hydrogen generated in an accident, a probability of zero is
assumed for the "high" generation rates because of the CAD system's
physical inability to dilute such large amounts of hydrogen.
For "medium" generation rates, the probelm can be analyzed from
two points of view: (1) if it is assumed that the hydrogen is
generated in one hour at 12x10 3 cu.ft./hr., the H2 concentration
will be just under the four volume percent flammability limit
so it is assured that the CAD system will be able to maintain
the H2 concentration below flammability with a probability
of success equal to its availability (0.9984 -- see Fig. 4.2).
On the other hand, (2) if the hydrogen is produced at a rate
of 12x103 cu.ft./hr. over a period longer than one hour, the
breaking point will be equal to the maximum injection and
venting capacity of the CAD system. In this case, the pro-
bability is assumed to be ~ 0.2 of being able to control the
Table 4.3
PROBABILITIES OF POST-ACCIDENT HYDROGEN CONTROL
HYDROGEN PRODUCTION
RATE
"HIGH"
"MEDIUM"
"LOW"
PROBABILITY OF
ACCIDENT P(A)
(per reactor-yr)
3x10-5
3x10
3x10-
3
WEIGHTING FUNCTION
OF P(A)
. 0.00901
0.09009
0.90090
ASSUMED HYDROGEN
PRODUCTION RATE
(cubic feet per
180,000
12,000
631.5
PROBABILITY SUCCESS
CAD SYSTEM P(S)
hr) (per design demand)
0.00
0.199 - 0.9984
0.9984
CIS PILGRIM I
P(S)
(per design demand)
CIS PEACH BOTTOM
P(S)
CAD SYSTEM
P(SIA)
(per design demand) (per accident)_
CIS PILGRIM I
P(S|A)
(per accident)
CIS PEACH BOTTOM
P(SJA)
(per accident)
H - 0.9870
M - 0.9870
. - 0.9870
0.9989
0.9989
0.9989
0.00
0.0179-0.0899
0.89946
0.9174-0.9894
e P(SA) = x )P(S) PEP(SAA
0.00889
0.08892
0.88919
0.9870
0.0090
0.0899
0.8999
0.9988
Note :
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hydrogen from reaching the flammability limit. For "low" generation
rates, the system availability (0.9984) is used. For the CIS,
probabilities- of success of 0.9870 (Pilgrim 1) and 0.9989 (Peach
Bottom) are used for all three H2 generation categories. These
values are derived from the equations 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8.
The final failure probabilities for the CAD system to prevent
hydrogen flammability over the range of theoretically possible
hydrogen generation rates are (based on the Vermont Yankee
CAD system design):
Pf (S/A)CAD 1 - 0.91739 - 8.26x10-2 /demand (4.9)
to
P (S/A)CAD 1 0.98936 - 1.06x10-2 /demand (4.10)
For the CIS system, the final failure probabilities are
-2
. P (S/A)Ci I- 0.9870 1.3x10 /demand for Pilgrim 1 (4.11)
and
Pf (S/A)CIS 1 - 0.9988 - 1.2x10-3/demand for Peach Bottom (4.12)
These results indicate that both systems have approximately
similar overall probabilities of controlling any amount of hydrogen
generated during reactor accident. Since the "low" hydrogen
generation rates have higher propabilities of occurrence, both systems
depend on the reliability of the system design. When comparing
the probability of success of the Vermont Yankee CAD system with that
of the CIS of Pilgrim 1 (see Table 4.3) for "low" hydrogen generation
rates, the CAD is more reliable than the CIS. When CAD is compared
with the CIS of Peach Bottom which has a redundant nitrogen make-up
subsystem, both systems have almost the same overall H2 control probability.
For "medium" generation rates, depending on the assumptions applied
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to the CAD system, it can be compared with the two CIS systems in
the same way as for the "low" hydrogen generation rates, or will
be 20% less reliable than the two CIS systems. For low probability
accidents with high hydrogen generation rates, it is assumed that
the CAD system cannot prevent hydrogen deflagration. If burning
does not occur, the CAD system could help to reduce the time to reach
detonation limits. Inerting can handle larger amounts of hydrogen
due .to maintaining oxygen concentration below five volume percent.
However, the inerting system is not in operation 24 hours prior
to shutdown and 24 hours after startup. During this period, the
containment has no protection against hydrogen generation reducing
the overall probability of handling the hydrogen. In this case,
the final result depends on the number of reactor shutdowns during
the year combined with the individual probabilities of the CIS
to handle the different amounts of hydrogen generated.
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CHAPTER FIVE
IMPACT OF CONTAINMENT INERTNG ON REACTOR SAFETY
The hazards of inerting were discussed in Chapter 2. The
consequences of lack of oxygen affects operational procedures
with regard to correcting leakage inside the primary containment,
thus impacting upon, the probability of leakage developing into
accident initiating events and increasing the number of unscheduled
shutdowns.
5.1 Potential Adverse Effects of Inerting on Reactor Safety.
During normal operation, the control room monitors
conditions in the drywell. Symptoms requiring immediate and
subsequent corrective actions can thus be identified (Fig. 5.1).
The major symptom of a developing problem is an increase in the
unidentified (or identified) leakage rate. Such leaks are
annunciated in the control room by the drywell unit cooler
annunciators drywell air cooler high drain flow and radiation
19 920leak detector, to name a few. Changes in drywell humidity and/
or significant changes in pressure, along with excessive sump
pump operation can also indicate the evolution of such a
19.20problem. 9 In order to control leakage, operator actions must
be iniciated such as: (i) monitoring the reactor vessel power,
pressure and water level, (ii) referral to the pipe break procedure
if appropriate (iii) monitoring the drywell floor and equipment
sump readings, and (iv) determining the location of the leak.
When the total unidentified leakage reaches 25 gallons per minute
in both inerted and non-inerted BWR containments, technical. specifications
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*Deinerting can be done 24 hours before shutdown but the drywell entry has to be performed after shutdown
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require the operators to shutdown the reactor.21 ,22 In the non-
inerted case, drywell entries at power can take place if the power
level is sufficiently reduced to between 50-70% full power.
Entry can take place without recourse to the use of bulky breathing
apparatus. Inspection permits the operators to determine the
seriousness of the problem, aiding them in their decision as to
whether to continue operation or to shutdown to make major repairs.
This option means that unnecessary plant shutdown can be avoided
in many cases, reducing the stress placeddon the system that occurs
from shutdown and affecting the probability of failure of the heat
removal system. Also, in those cases where shutdown is deemed
necessary, unnecessary delays in startup can be avoided since the
inerting procedure is not required.
During inerted containment operation, drywell entries at
power are not permitted by industry practice because the excessive
20
danger such entry would reptesent to plant personnel. Leakage:
identification. is ,theref ore made more difficult. Technical
specifications require that the operator insures drywell fans are
operating at all times, and that the torus temperature be main-
tained below 80*F. The torus spray system is initiated if torus
pressure should exceed 175 psig and venting of the primary
containment through the standby gas treatment system is also
initiated.20 No attempts are taken to stop leakage, which is
allowed to increase to the five gallon per minute criterion
whereupon the reactor is shutdown. Entry usually requires that
the containment be purged until oxygen concentration reaches
20 volume percent, which usually requires 24 hours. However, during
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emergencies. entry could be permitted as early as one hour after
shutdown but with sce risk to the plant personnel making such
entry.23
Deinerting consists of injecting air into the containment
while ventirrg nitrogen through the standby gas treatment system.
The decision. to vent depends upon the activity level of the gas
and the mandated lIIts placed on such discharges to the atmos-
phere. If. the flow rate is restricted, the concentration of
oxygen will. increase more slowly requiring more than 24 hours to
deinert.24 Under normal conditions, the oxygen concentration must
reach 20 volIme percent before entry can take place. Even so,
breathing apparatus (Scott packs) are used. The breathing
apparatus is an open circuit apparatus with a high-pressure cylinder
of air or oxygen, a cylinder valve, a demand regulator, a facepiece,
and tube assembly with an exhalation valve. The use of this
apparatus limits access to the problem area inside the containment,
because of its bulk (50 lbs. weight), the discomfort of the facemask,
and the possibility of leaks or rupture of the equipment.
After repairs are complete, the containment is inerted within
24 hours after startup of the plant. At the Nine Point nuclear
station, Unit 1, the reactor was shutdown to repack a recirculation
valve. After the repairs, the unit was restarted while waiting for
the delivery of two trucks of nitrogen. The trucks did not arrive
causing a 24 hour delay in the normal scheduled startup of the unit. 2 8
The cost of the nitrogen used for inerting is approximately
$50,000 per year, which is not an insignificant cost. 25
104
All of these considerations (e.g., time to detect, evaluate,
and repair a component, number of unscheduled shutdowns and nitrogen
supply availability) affects the capacity factor of the plant.
Also, components are affected due to extra stress during shutdown
and startup increasing the probability of failure of the equipment
(see Section 5.3). Early detection and corrective action may
affect the likelihood of a small lead evolving into a significant.
LOCA initiating event. This likelihood is now analyzed using data
on drywell entries from the Vermont Yankee plant.
5.2 Analysis of Drywell Entries at Power
In order to evaluate the safety aspects involved in the location,
evaluation and isoluation of a leakage inside the drywell, it is
necessary to know the circumstances under which an entry is made
and its effects on the overall safety of the plant.
There are four different circumstances in which an entry
to the drywell has been made; (i) entries to perform preventive
maintenance during scheduled shutdown, (ii) emergency situations
wherein the reactor is shutdown due to malfunction of equipment
inside the drywell, (iii) entries during an unscheduled shutdown
not associated with anything in the containment but useful for
inspection purposes and (iv) entries after reduction of power as a
consequence of monitoring a malfunction inside the drywell that does
24
not require an immediate shutdown. The last three types of entries
are affected by containment inerting. For example, in an emergency
situation requiring an immediate shutdown, entry would be delayed
because of the need to deinert the containment.*
*Estimates of the delay range from 3 - 10 hours at minimum.
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. During the period from May 5, 1974 to August 28, 1979,
several drywell entries at power were performed at Vermont Yankee
in order to identify and repair potential leaks in drywell
equipment. According to plant data on entries, most of the repairs
were made in packing or bonnet leaks on recirculation valves
(Fig. 5.2). One of these valves (RV-43A) was backseated four
times durihg the period as follows: '
(i) May 5, 1974: drywell equipment drain sump leakage was
observed to increase to 4.6 gpm due to a packing
leakage (according to a plant operator20 the normal
leakage rate is 1.4 gpm);
(ii) May 11, 1976: drywell equipment sump leakage indicates sharp
increase from 1.8 gpm to 3.3 gpm due to packing
leakage;
(iii) May 6, 1977: drywell equipment drain sump leakage increases
from 1.8 gpm to 3.9 gpm due to packing leakage;
and
(iv) Nov. 7, 1978: drywell equipment drain sump leakage increase 0.25
gpm due to packing leak.
The same valve in loop B of the recirculation system (RV-43B).
was backseated three times during the period as follows:
(i) Feb. 5, 1977: drywell equipment sump leakage increased from
1.8 gpm to 2.0 due to packing leakage;
(ii) Dec. 25, 1977: drywell equipment drain sump leakage increased
from 1.8 gpm to 2.1 gpm due to packing leakage; and
(iii)Aug. 28, 1979: drywell equipment drain sump leakage increased by
1.5 gpm due to packing leakage.
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Figure 5.2 Schematic of BWR Reactor Coolant System4 5
Bonnet leaks in recirculation valves were found on March 23,
1975 in RV-43A and on August 13, 1979 in RV-53A. Other entries to
the drywell included an inspection of one of the two recirculation
pumps to check a possible water-to-oil cavity leak. The pump was
secured and the reactor shutdown for repairs. During these entries,
other malfunctions such as loose belts, stuck valves, fan failures,
were discovered and the problem solved before resuming full-power
operation.20
These entry data are used here as a conservative way to
estimate the leakage failure rate in order to assess the possibility
of a break in the recirculation system. Where data is not available,
32
WASU-1400 failure data is used. The leakage failure rate for
the individual valves are shown in Table 5.1. This individual
leakage rate means that any of the valves or pumps of
the recirculation system can leak above the normal leakage rate
(1.4 to 1.8 gpm) up to 5 gpm (limit of unidentified leakage to
shutdown the reactor).
The sequence of events that can lead to a loss-of-coolant
accident in the recirculation system is shown in Fig. 5.3. In order
to estimate the rate at which the leaks become breaks, a complete
fatigue study would need to be completed for the individual valves.
A rough estimate by Professor N. C. Rasmussen based on WASEH-1400 32
establishes a factor of 2000 to 20000 between the probability of
leakage and the probability of valve rupture. Leakage rate from
the pumps is assumed to be negligible based on Vermont Yankee
experience.
Table 5.]1
LEAKAGE FAILURE RATES FOR VALVES OF THE RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
(65 months period)
LEAKAGE FAILURE RATE
(leak increase/hour)
1. 07x10~ 4
2.13x10 5
6. 41cl0-5
1. 00x10-8
*
*
*
* Data from drywell entries at Vermont Yankee nuclear power station.
* Data from WASH-1400.
VALVE
RV-43A
RV 53A
RV-43B
RV-53B
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Figure 5.3 Fault Tree of LOCA Iniciating Events o
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Using the probabilities from Table 5.1, the fault tree of
Fig. 5.3 is quantified to find an estimate of the contribution
of valve leakage to the initiation of a small medium sized LOCA.
From drywell entry experience, the probability of valve rupture
from valve leakage is estimated to vary between 10~8 and 10 7 /hr.
From WASH-100 failure data, the same probability is 4x10~8 /hr.
The contributions from circumferential break, feedwater line break
and steam line break are around 3x10 /hr. Using entry data and
the propagation factors, the importance of stopping leaks in the
recirculation system before a major problem develops can be esti-
mated. Further experimental testing of the recirculation valves
needs to be done in order to assess the effect of fatigue and
thermal stress on the propagation factor, particularly those
experienced during unscheduled reactor shutdowns.
The analysis shows that one might expect a reduction in
the LOCA initiation rate of approximately one order of magnitude,
(from, say, 6x10-8/ni. to 6x10~9 /hr.). This could theoretically*
be achieved by following the Vermont Yankee operating procedures for
citing and correcting those problems accessible to drywell entries
at power. Moreover, such practices reduce the shutdown frequency
per year, thus reducing the probability of failure of the
heat removal system, a major contributor to the total overall
BWR accident risk.
5.3 Effects of Additional Shutdowns on Overall BWR Accident Risk
In previous sections, the effects of inerting on operating
procedures and leakage rates were discussed. One of the points
considered included the increase in the number of unscheduled
shutdowns due to inerting during a shutdown, decay heat removal
systems are required to operate to prevent core melt.45 This
condition is included in the transient events that dominate
the releases in almost all the BWR risk categories (Table 5.2).
The probability of failure of the decay heat removal system was
determined in WASH-1400 to be - 1.6x10-6/yr., which can be combined
with the number of total shutdowns for reactor year. The
diffefence between the number of shutdowns in a BWR operating
with a CAD system and the number of shutdowns in a BWR operating
with an inerted containment will directly affect the transient
events that are dominant in- BWR accident sequences. To determine
this number, it is necessary to investigate the operational
histories of BWR inerted containment shutdowns in order to
investigate the shutdowns that could have been avoided if the
containment had not been inerted. For example, about ten shutdowns
per year can be expected in a BWR with an inerted containment.4 5
Combining the probability of failure of the decay heat removal
system with the ten transients per reactor year, this yields
1.6x10-5/r-yr. for the sequence. Table 5.3 shows how the probability
increases as the number of shutdowns increases. If the number of
shutdowns is reduced to 5 per year by using a non-inerted containment,
the probability decreases to 8x10 6 /r-yr. Due to the fact that
this sequence is a dominant one, this reduction in probability
affects directly the overall BWR accident risk. According to
WAS-1400, the unavailability of the delay heat removal system is
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KEY TO BWR ACCIDENT SEQUENCE SYMEOLS 4 5
A - Rupture of
a - Failure of
.C - Failure of
D - Failure of
E - Failure of
F - Failure of
G - Failure of
H - Failure of
I - Failure of
J - Failure of
M - Failure of
P - Failure- of
Q - Failure of
S - Small pipe
S - Small pipe2
T
U
V
W
T
C3
6
reactor coolant boundary with an equivalent diameter of greater than six inches.
electric power to ESFs.
the reactor protection system.
vapor suppression.
emergency core cooling injcction.
emergency core cooling functionab.ility.
containment isolation to limit leakage to less than 100 volume per cent per day.
core spray recirculation system.
low pressure recirculation system.
high pressure service water system.
safety/relief valves to open.
safety/relief valves to reclose after opening.
normal feedwater system to provide core make-up water.
break with an equivalent diameter of about 2"-6".
break with an equivalent diameter of about 1/2"-2".
- Transient event.
- Failure of HPCI or RCIC to provide core make-up water.
- Failure of low pressure ECCS to provide core make-up water.
- Failure .to- remove residual core heat.
- Containment failure due to steam explosion in vessel.
-Containment failure due to steam explosion in containment.
- Containment failure due to overpressure - release through reactor building.
- Containment failure due to overpressure - release direct to.atmosphere.
- Containment isolation failure in drywell.
- Containment isolation failure in wetwell.
- Containment leakage greater than 2400 volume per cent per day.
- Reactor building isolation failure.
- Standby gas treatment system failure.
KEY TO TABLE 5.2
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Table 5.3
DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM PROBABILITY PER NUMBER OF REACTOR
SHUTDOWNS IN A YEAR
NUMB3ER OF REACTOR
SHUTDOWNS
1
2
3
4
5.
6
7
8
9
10
PROBABILITY/REACTOR-YEAR
DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM
1. 6x10-6
3.2x10-6
4.8x10-6
6.4x10-6
8.0x10-6
9.6x10- 6
1.1x10-5
1.3x10-5
1. 4x10-5
1.6x10-5
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responsible for - 64.5% of the total risk. A recent study
(EPRI, 1978) shows that the delay heat removal system is
responsible for - 83% of the total risk.48 On the other hand,
Tony Buhl 46 and Robert Bernero 47 show that transient events
and theirconsequences remain essentially unaffected by use.of
a non-inerted containment (Table 5.4 and 5.5). The model used
in Buhl's study assumed that all core melts from LOCAs resulting
in hydrogen explosions which rupture the containment demonstrate
that the overall risk is insensitive to containment inerting.
Bernero also indicates that with respect to the failure of thi
shutdown heat removal system, inerting has a negligible impact on
the overall BWR risk.
.
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TABLE 5.4
EFECTS OF A NON-INERTED CONTAINiENT ON RISK4 6
EVENT TREE CONTAINMENT RELEASE CATEGORIES
ATMOSPHERE
LARGE LOCA INERTED 8x10 9 6x10-8 2x10~ 2%10-8
- -82 -9NON-INERTED 3x10 2x10 2x10 .2x1O
SMALL LOCA INERTED lx1O 8 9x10-
8  2x1O7 2x1O-8
NON-INERTED 3x10-8 3x10 3x10 3x10~9
SMALLEST LOCA INERTED 2x10-8 1V10 4x10 7  4x10-8
NON-INERTED 6x10 8  5x1 5x1- 8  5x10 9
TRANSIENTS INERTED lx10-6  6x10 6  2x1O- 5  2x10-6
NON-INERTED 1x10- 6  6x10- 6  2x1O-5 2x10-6
REACTOR VESSEL INERTED 2x10 9  2x10-8  lx1O 110-8
-- 7 -8 -9RUPTURE NON-INERTED 1xlO 1x1o 1x1o 1X10
SUMMATION OF INERTED 1x10- 6  6x10- 6  2x10-5 2x10-6
ALL SEQUENCES NON-INERTED lxlO 6 -7t10-6 2x10-5 2x10-6
________~ __ _ _ _ _t
9
Table 5.5
PERSPECTIVES ON RSS-BWR DESIGN 47(WR 4,MARK I CONTAINMENT, INERTED)
CONTAINMENT
OVERPRESSURE
FAILURE
SCENARIOS
POTENTIAL RISK
IMPACT
OF SCENARIO INERTING
CONTROLLED
VENTING
FILTER
Transient followed by
failure to shutdown.
Transient followed by
failure of shutdown
heat removal system.
Transient followed by
failure to provide
make-up water.
Small LOCA followed by
failure to provide make-
up water.
CONT. FAILS
77 MIN.
CONT. FAILS
2820 MIN.
START MELT
160 MIN.
NTART MELT
57 MIN.
MELT STARTS
100 MIN.
MELT STARTS-
3260 MIN.
END MELT
200 MIN.
END MELT
102 MIN.
MELT ENDS
144 MIN.
MELT ENDS
3390 MTN.
CONT. FAILS
232 MIN.
CONT. FAILS
117 MIN.
Large
(Dominant)
Sequence
Large
(Dominant)
Medium
to
Small
Medium
to
Small
Negligible
Negligible
Small to
Moderate
Moderate
to Large
Small Moderate
to
Large
Small Small
to
Moderate
MARCU/CORRAL; BCL Accident Process Modeling
H
H
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The probabilistic safety analysis performed in this thesis
shows that the inerting and air dilution systems have approximately
the same overall probability of handling the hydrogen generated
during an accident, preventing the hydrogen from reaching
flammafrty limits that could lead to combustible mixtures.
Inerting controls the combustible mixture over the entire range
of accidents, from high probability-low consequence accidents,
to low probability-high consequence accidents, while the air
dilution system can handle the hydrogen only for low hydrogen
generation accidents (high probability of- occurrence). Depending
on the assumptions made, (i.e.hydrogen produced in one hour or
longer at a "medium" generation rate) the CAD system can handle
the hydrogen with a higher (0.0899) or lower (0.0179) probability
of success. For hidrogen generated in low probability-high
*consequence accidents, the CAD system is not useful. Th'e
fault tree analysis represents an organized source of information
required to improve the designs of the hydrogen control systems
(i.e., reducing operator dependence and including greater
redundancy).
Accident initiating events can be reduced in non-inerted
containments since drywell entries at power permit identification,
evaluation, and repair of leaks. Entries cannot be done in
inerted containments due to hazards due to lack of oxygen.
The probability of leaks becoming breaks is so low that their
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tolerance does not affect the overall total BWR accident risk. However,
entires can reduce the number of nscheduled shutdowns, affecting not
only the capacity factor of the plant but also the probability of failure
of the decay heat removal system because each time the reactor is shutdown
(whether planned or not), the decay heat removal system has to be used
to prevent core melt. This condition is included in the dominant tran-
sients vents in BWRs. These probabilities are affected directly by the
number of reactor shutdowns.
The calculations .in this thesis were performed using conservative
values and assumptions in order to structure the. methodology. The study
was based on the four volume percent hydrogen flammability limit estab-
lished by the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.7. Detailed further studies on hydro-
gen properties are recommended in order to establish more accurate data for
designing better hydrogen control systems, and for calculating hydrogen
control probabilities on the systems. It should be further be noted that
inerting may have certain beneficial effects such as reduced corrosion
that have not been accounted for in this analysis.
This thesis analyzed two hydrogen control systems operating in
two existing plants, and provides a comparison between the two systems.
Systems can vary from plant to plant, and the results can be different.
However, when comparing an inerted plant with a non-inerted one,
the number of unscheduled shutdowns will have a direct effect on the over-
all risk. Therefore, detailed analysis of shutdowns and their causes is
recommended .ih order to extend the comparison between inerted and non-
inerted containments.
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Appendix
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO INERTING IN BWR CONTAINMENTS
A. Introduction
Two other considerations related to inerting were identified in con-
versations with utility engineers.* These include the potential for
positive benefit from inerting in: (1) reducing the corrosion rates of
the torus vessel and the termination boxes of the electrical outlets
found in the torus, and (2) reducing the likelihood of fires inside the
primary containment compartment. These considerations were not analyzed
in detail in Lepervanche's engineers thesis since that analysis concerned
itself primarily with the issue of hydrogen control and the differences
in the impact on public health and safety. The issues of corrosion and
fire are analyzed in.-more detail here.
B. Effects on Corrosion Rates in the Torus
Utility engineers -contacted here observed some teduction in corrosion
effects on the torus vessel at the Pilgrim I and Millstone BWR plants. 1,2
Although this effect has been attributed to the reduction in the oxygen
content in the torus atmosphere due to inerting, a quantitative comparison
of corrosion effects between non-inerted and inerted BWRs has not taken
place. Even so, the corrosion effect would have limited impact on the
overall BWR safety risk as the only major impact such an effect might have
* The utility engineers contacted were those identified as having supported
the concept of inerting from viewpoints other than (or including) the
specific hydrogen control issue. These engineers included representatives
of Northern States Power Co. (Musolf) and the Institute for Nuclear Power
Operations (Rosen).
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is in producing so much debris as to begin to clog up the screens on the
ECCS system.2 However, these screens have a grid size of 1/2" so that only
very substantial corrosion effects could stand to produce the size of
debris particle that might pose such a problem.
Other utilities contacted3 have not observed such effects, and argue
that the dissolved oxygen content in the torus water would not vary
significantly between the inerted and non-inerted case to warrant a. sub-
stantial effect on the torus. corrosion rate. They further argue that the
protective painted coating on the torus surface protects sufficiently
against major corrosion problems, and therefore that the identified potential
advantage of inerting due to corrosion is not a significant one in any case.
An additional effect observed by one utility2 was a reduced corrosion
effect on the termination boxes of the electrical outlets found in the
torus. Again, the observed effe'ct was not major, but as was pointed out
in the conversation, might be of potential importance. As the termination
boxes are fully insulated against water leakage and are designed to with-
4
stand high corrosion, rates , the observed small reduction in box corrosion.
rate is not considered to have a significant effect on the failure rates
of the electrical circuitry and instrumentation related to these boxes
and therefore, has no significant impact on the overall risk calculation.
C. The Impact of Inerting on the BWR Primary Containment Compartment Fire
Hazard
The issue of fires in the BWR primary containment compartment was
identified as being a significant potential benefit of inerting.2 In
subsequent conversations with licensing engineers versed in the area of
4,5BWR fire risk, it was discovered that there are two sources of combus-
tible material inside the primary containment of a Mark I BWR: (1) the
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reactor recirculation pump fuel oil (50 gallons in each of the two pumps
found on the primary coolant loop), and (2) the electrical cable, which is
fire resistant but can ignite at higher temperatures.
There are three possible ways in which a fire inside the containment
can be initiated: (1) oil leak from the recirculation pump during operation,
(2) during shutdown and maintenance a welding related oil fire where
welding catches the fuel oil on fire, and (3) electrical motor fire in the
pump. All of these events relate to the recirculation pump; in cases
(1) and (2), the event can lead potentially to a major fire in the contain-
ment defined to be where the electrical cabling would also be affected;
in case (3), the fire would be confined to the pump casing itself but
would result in pump failure. This would not be as significant a problem
since adequate cooling can be maintained by either one of the recirculation
pumps - even in the event of a simultaneous failure of both pumps, the BWR
can be sufficiently cooled by natural recirculation.
Impact of Primary Containment Fires on RHRS Availability
.he worst possible scenario invovng a fire in the primary containment
would be a loss of both recirculation pumps as a result of an oil leak for
one pump - igniting a fire spreading to the electrical cables, then igniting
the second recirculation pump oil supply.* In this scenario, both pumps
would thus be made inoperative, requiring that auxiliary cooling systems
be employed to help ensure adequate cooling. Since a loss of primary
coolant is not an expected result of even the worst fire scenario within
the primary containment, failure of auxiliary cooling systems would not
* This is a low probability scenario as the recirculation pump oil supplies
are shielded against fire as a precautionary measure.
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result in a serious problem since the BWR is designed such that adequate
cooling is provided for natural circulation in the reactor core. Further,
the auxiliary cooling system major components are located exterior to the
primary containment (see Figure A.1). A fire in the primary containment
cannot likely lead, therefore, to the initiation -of a loss of coolant
accident; although the fire would result in an additional reactor shutdown,
it would not likely lead to an effect on the RHRS (residual heat removal
system). With a fire occurrence frequency in the drywell of between
1.6 x 10-2 10-3 per reactor year* it can be shown that the impact of a
fire on the number of shutdowns per year is negligible as the average number
of unplanned shutdowns currently rests between 2-6 per reactor-year (see
Table A.I). Thus, the impact of fires in the primary containment on the
dominant BWR accident sequence is relatively negligible.
From another standpoint, it is also possible to show that the potential
benefit from inerting with respect to fires is overshadowed by the disbenefit
of inerting with respect to early maintenance and inspection (this disbenefit
leads to a possible order-of-magnitude increase in the small-to-medium size
LOCA initiation rate (see p. 110, Lepervanche)). Figure A.2 shows the
fire event tree for the inerted vs non-inerted cases:. With the addition of an
oil leak collection system on each recirculation pump, the significant fire
initiation rate drops from 1.16 x 10-6/hr to 1.01 x 10 /hr in the non-inerted
case, compared with a range of 2.6 x 10 7/hr to 1.09 x 10~ /hr in the
inerted case (see Table A.,II), -------
* -2
The value of 1.6 x 10 -/r-year comes from a paper by Apostolakis and
Kazarian, which reports this value for a fire in an LWR containment.
Although not specifically applicable to the BWR 'drywell, this number is
assumed to provide an upper estimate on the frequency of a drywell fire.
Figure A.1 ECCS SYSTEM INCLUSIVE OF LOW PRESSURE COOLING
INJECTION MODE OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM
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Table A.I
COMPARISON OF EXPERIENCE:INERTED BWRs VS. NON-INERTED BWRs*
Avg. No. of
unscheduled
entries/yrPlant Name -
% of 'entries
resulting in
plant shutdown
for repair # shutdowns/yr
Plants normally
operated with
small leakage
Entries
normally
performed with
plant inerted
Hatch, Unit 1
Cooper
Nine Mile Point, Unit 1
Brunswick, Unit 1
FitzPatrick
Quad Cities, Unit 1
Quad Cities, Unit~2
Peach Bottom, Unit 2
Peach Bottom, Unit 3
Monticello
Pilgrim
Dresden, Unit 2
Dresden, Unit 3
Duane Arnold
Browns Ferry, Unit 1
Browns Ferry, Unit 2
Browns Ferry, Unit 3
Vermont Yankee
Hatch, Unit 2
5
1
3
6
2
4.
2
3
4
2
64
100
92
70
100
54
43
100
3
3
2
2
3
1
4
4
9
3.2
2.8
4.2
2
2
1
- 3
4
2
100
90
90
100
20
100
3
2.7
1.8
2
3
1
4
.8
9
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
N/A
N/A
* From NRC staff position (Butler, 1980).
rx,
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table A.II
Serious Fire Initiation Rate Per Hour in a BWR Drywell
(With/Without Oil Leak Collection System on Recirc Pumps)
Fire Inerted Non-Inerted
Initiation
Event With Without With Without
Welding 1.09 x 107 9.89 x 10-8
Oil Leak 1.5 x 10-10 1.5 x 10 1.06 x 10~9 1.06 x.10-6
Total 1.09 x 10 7 2.59 x 10 1.01 x 10~7 1.16 x 10-6
From Figure A.2, it is evident that when no oil spill collection
system is installed in the non-inerted case, the fire initiation rate is
-5 times greater than for the inerted case. The installation of such a
system causes the welding initiated fires to dominate the overall yearly
fire risk in the drywell such that the difference between the inerted and
non-inerted cases is quite small. Also, since inerting may result in pro-
ducing more unscheduled reactor shutdowns per year, the fire initiation
rate may be less for the non-inerted case (by a factor of ~ 1.08 given
:oil collection systems are installed in both cases and assuming twice as
many unscheduled shutdowns per year for 'the inerted case).*,, Thus, it is
concluded that as long as an oil leak collection system is installed on
each recirculation pump, the difference in fire hazard between the inerted
and non-inerted cases is relatively negligible since then the welding
initiated fires during shutdowns domingte the total yearly drywell fire risk.
* This factor may be a negligible one in that the dominant contribution to the
yearly shutdown time is the 6 week period assumed for annual refueling.
A8
Figure A.2
EVENT TREE FOR FIRES INITIATED IN11SIDE BWR
INERTED (OR NON-INERTED) DRYWELL CONTAINMENT STRUCTURES
Event Catgories
Yearly Fire
Initiation Rates
in LWR Containments
(from A ostolakis
et al.)
Percentage of
Recorded Fires
Due to Oil Leaks
and Welding
(from French
Study) 7
Percentage of Year
Containment
Susceptible to
Indicated Fire
Type*
Inerted Case
Oil Collection
System Installed
on Recirc Pumps
(Failure
Probability of
System Assumed
10-3 per year)
Fire Resistant
Non-Inerted Case
YES
F .
(1.6 x 10 -2
(.58)
OIL LEAKS
(.42)
YES (1)
-3NO (10 )
NO (.871 )
WELDING
YES (.129)
* For the inerted case, the containment is only susceptible to fires of any
type during periods of shutdown; likewise, for the non-inerted case in the
welding event sequence. The percentages were calculated assuming
6 weeks for annual refueling added to the number of unscheduled shutdowns
per year (assumed 4 per year for inerting, 2 per year for non-inerting).
I
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